
















The Optimal Climate Policy 
Portfolio when Knowledge 
Spills Across Sectors 
By Emanuele Massetti, Fondazione Eni 
Enrico Mattei and Euro-Mediterranean 
Center for Climate Change 







 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it 
 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Series 
Editor: Carlo Carraro 
 
The Optimal Climate Policy Portfolio when Knowledge Spills 
Across Sectors 
By Emanuele Massetti, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Euro-
Mediterranean Center for Climate Change 
Lea Nicita, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
 
Summary 
This paper studies the implications for climate policy of the interactions between 
environmental and knowledge externalities. Using a numerical analysis performed with the 
hybrid integrated assessment model WITCH, extended to include mutual spillovers between 
the energy and the non-energy sector, we show that the combination between environmental 
and knowledge externalities provides a strong rationale for implementing a portfolio of 
policies for both emissions reduction and the internalisation of knowledge externalities. 
Moreover, we show that implementing technology policy as a substitute for stabilisation 
policy is likely to increase global emissions. 
 
Keywords: Technical Change, Climate Change, Development, Innovation, Spillovers 
 
JEL Classification: C72, H23, Q25, Q28, O31, O41, Q54 
 
 
This paper is part of the research work being carried out by the Sustainable Development Programme 
at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and by the Climate Impacts and Policy Division of the Euro-
Mediterranean Center on Climate Change. Financial support from the Italian Ministry of the 
Environment and the PASHMINA project is gratefully acknowledged. The authors are grateful to 
Carlo Carraro for useful comments and remarks. The authors are also grateful to participants at the 














Address for correspondence: 
 
Lea Nicita 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Isola di San Giorgio Maggiore 
30124 Venice 
Italy  
E-mail: lea.nicita@feem.it  
The Optimal Climate Policy Portfolio  
When Knowledge Spills Across Sectors 
 
Emanuele Massetti 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Euro-Mediterranean Center for Climate Change 
 
Lea Nicita 









This paper studies the implications for climate policy of the interactions between 
environmental and knowledge externalities. Using a numerical analysis performed with the 
hybrid integrated assessment model WITCH, extended to include mutual spillovers 
between the energy and the non-energy sector, we show that the combination between 
environmental and knowledge externalities provides a strong rationale for implementing a 
portfolio of policies for both emissions reduction and the internalisation of knowledge 
externalities. Moreover, we show that implementing technology policy as a substitute for 
stabilisation policy is likely to increase global emissions. 
 
Keywords: Technical Change, Climate Change, Development, Innovation, Spillovers 





* Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Euro-Mediterranean Center for Climate Change 
** Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
 
This paper is part of the research work being carried out by the Sustainable Development Programme at 
the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and by the Climate Impacts and Policy Division of the Euro-
Mediterranean Center on Climate Change. Financial support from the Italian Ministry of the Environment 
and the PASHMINA project is gratefully acknowledged. The authors are grateful to Carlo Carraro for 
useful comments and remarks. The authors are also grateful to participants at the CESifo Conference on 
Energy and Climate Economics, in particular to Michael Hoel and Reyer Gerlagh. 
 
Correspondence address: Lea Nicita, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Campo S. Maria Formosa, Castello 
5252, 30122 Venice, Italy (lea.nicita@feem.it).   1
1. Introduction 
There is now a wide agreement that any stringent policy to reduce the concentration of 
atmospheric concentrations of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) will call for a tremendous effort in 
technological innovation. Therefore, at the frontier of climate and energy modelling research we 
find the study of innovation dynamics. During the last decade the description of technical 
change in integrated models for climate policy analysis has greatly improved.
1 However, current 
approaches still omit important elements that affect the dynamics of technical change and a 
broader framework for analysing technical change is advocated. In particular, knowledge 
externalities, although pervasive and extremely relevant in shaping innovation dynamics, are 
usually not modelled. 
The presence of market failures in the R&D sector, as emphasized by Griliches (1957, 1992), is 
confirmed by the evidence, virtually found in all studies, that the social rate of return on R&D 
expenditure is higher than the corresponding private rate
2: estimates of the marginal social rate 
of return to R&D investment range between 30 and 50 percent and of private return between 7 
and 15 percent. 
Spillovers are generally acknowledged as a fundamental aspect of technical change. The new 
growth theory that has followed the seminal work of Romer (1990), has emphasised the 
importance of international R&D knowledge spillovers (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, chs.11 
and 12), and of both intrasectoral and intersectoral R&D knowledge spillovers in explaining 
countries’ productivity (Jones, 1999; Li, 2000). Those contributions have stimulated the 
development of a number of studies that estimate the importance of R&D spillovers among 
firms, sectors or countries.
3 Overall, the available empirical evidence supports the idea that 
spillover effects are relevant and positive, even if, due to the variety of methodologies used, 
estimates span over a wide range and their significance varies across studies.  
When it comes to technologies for carbon emissions reduction, the difference between private 
and social rate of return to R&D investment arises from a double externality: the presence of 
both environmental and knowledge externalities. First, without a price on carbon that equates 
the global and the private cost of emitting GHGs, all low emissions technologies are relatively 
                                                 
1 See Gillingham et al. (2008) for a recent overview of modelling methodology. 
2 Among others Mansfield (1977, 1996), Jaffe (1986), Hall (1996), and Jones and Williams (1998). 
3 An extensive review of the literature on spillovers at firm level can be found in Wieser (2005). Keller 
(2004) reviews a large part of the literature on international spillovers.   2
disadvantaged and the level of investment is therefore sub-optimal. Second, the private return to 
investment in R&D is lower than the social return of investment due to the incomplete 
appropriability of knowledge creation, thus pushing further away investments from the socially 
optimal level.
4 
Many researchers that have worked on the optimal design of climate policy have stressed the 
importance of studying climate policy in a second-best setting considering the double 
externality. For example, Jaffe et al. (2005) proposes to use a portfolio made of a price signal to 
correct for the environmental externality coupled with a policy to support investment in 
technologies to reduce GHG emissions. The idea of complementing a stabilisation policy with 
an R&D policy in order to address both externalities at once is instead opposed by Nordhaus 
(2009). He argues that once the environmental externality is corrected, there are no evident 
reasons to treat research in technologies to reduce GHG emissions differently from other kinds 
of research that share the same characteristic of public good. 
These doubts recently raised by Nordhaus (2009) clearly show that we are far from 
understanding the optimal policy mix that reduces effectively and efficiently global warming 
and climate change. This paper contributes to the literature by providing answers to three sets of 
major policy questions using a sophisticated modelling environment in which it is possible to 
study both the environmental and the knowledge externality. 
These three sets of policy questions are the following. First, what is the optimal response, in 
terms of investments in R&D (both in energy and non-energy technologies) of a policy to 
stabilise the atmospheric concentrations of GHGs, when domestic intersectoral knowledge 
spillovers are explicitly modelled? Can we expect that the stabilisation policy will drive the 
economies closer to or farther from the socially optimal level of innovation? Second, what 
would be the optimal amount of R&D spending and what would be the environmental 
consequences of correcting only knowledge externalities? Third, what are the welfare 
implications of addressing both environmental and knowledge externalities with a policy mix 
that combines a stabilisation policy and R&D policies to support the optimal level of 
innovation? 
To provide an answer to these questions we have up-graded the hybrid Integrated Assessment 
Model WITCH model by introducing knowledge spillovers between R&D investments to 
increase energy efficiency (energy sector) and investments in knowledge creation to increase the 
                                                 
4 For an introduction to the literature on the double externality see Nordhaus (1990).   3
productivity of the capital-labour aggregate (non-energy sector). We build upon previous work 
in which knowledge dynamics of the WITCH model have been enriched by introducing directed 
technical change in energy and non-energy inputs (Carraro, Massetti and Nicita, 2009) and we 
abstract from international spillovers, which, as we show in a previous paper (Bosetti et al, 
2008), have a modest role in shaping innovation dynamics. 
Our work represents a pioneer attempt to introduce intersectoral spillovers in a complex 
Integrated Assessment Model (IAM). IAMs typically do not explicitly describe market failures. 
Until now, the few attempts to incorporate R&D spillovers in integrated models for the study of 
climate policy have been confined to the inclusion of intrasectoral spillovers (Popp, 2006), and 
international spillovers (e.g. Bosetti et al, 2008). However, empirical studies provide evidence 
that intersectoral spillovers are extremely significant, as claimed by Wieser (2005) in his broad 
review of the literature. Without intersectoral spillovers, models unrealistically assume that the 
advance of technological frontiers of different sectors is mutually independent, omitting the 
interactions among the different drivers of technical change. 
By describing endogenous knowledge development dynamics in a second-best world, we are 
able to produce insights on the widely debated question of the optimal portfolio of climate 
policies. Moreover, our numerical assessments give quantitative foundations to a debate that has 
been theoretical and not grounded on empirical basis so far. 
Goulder and Schneider (1997) and Popp (2006) are the two main studies that analyse by means 
of computational models with knowledge externalities a climate policy portfolio in which R&D 
policy is coupled with a policy to reduce GHG emissions. However, there are major differences 
among modelling assumptions that allow only marginal comparisons of results. First and 
foremost Goulder and Schneider (1997) and Popp (2006) concentrate only on intrasectoral 
spillovers. The WITCH model displays intrasectoral spillovers and in principle it is possible to 
replicate the analysis of the earlier studies. We assume, however, that the intrasectoral 
inefficiencies in knowledge creation are fully internalised and we instead concentrate on 
intersectoral spillovers to incorporate the complex interaction of R&D dynamics between two 
broad sectors that are affected differently by a policy to reduce GHG emissions. A further 
difference with respect to Popp (2006) is that we do not exogenously impose that increased 
spending in energy R&D crowds-out other kinds of R&D investments. By modelling 
endogenous knowledge accumulation in the two knowledge stocks, we can describe the optimal 
reallocation of resources to R&D in general, and between sectors. Our conclusions depart in a 
number of ways from those of previous studies, as we explain in the following.   4
Our analysis is both oriented to answer policy questions and to discuss modelling issues. We 
aim to provide useful insights both to policy analysts and to the community of modellers. 
Section 2 briefly describes the model and Section 3 presents calibration details. Section 4 
describes the basic features of the Business as Usual scenario (BaU) and introduces historical 
evidence on R&D patterns. Section 5 examines how incentives to invest in different kinds of 
R&D are changed by a policy whose aim is to correct the global environmental externality that 
arises from GHGs emissions. Section 6 explores the problem from the opposite angle and we 
look at the implications for the environment of solving the sole knowledge externality. Section 7 
studies the welfare implications of addressing both externalities. Finally, Section 8 introduces 
the results of the sensitivity analysis. We conclude by assessing our results against earlier 
findings in the literature, drawing policy implications and suggesting some patterns for further 
research. 
2. Model Description 
2.1 Short model description 
WITCH (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid) is a regional integrated assessment model 
structured to provide normative information on the optimal responses of world economies to 
climate damages (Bosetti et al. 2006, 2009b; Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni, 2007). 
It is a hybrid model because it combines features of both top-down and bottom-up modelling: 
the top-down component consists of an inter-temporal optimal growth model in which the 
energy input of the aggregate production function has been integrated into a bottom-up like 
description of the energy sector. WITCH’s top-down framework guarantees a coherent, fully 
intertemporal allocation of investments, including those in the energy sector. 
World countries are aggregated in twelve regions on the basis of geographic, economic and 
technological vicinity (see Footnote 18 for a list of regions) which interact strategically on 
global externalities: greenhouse gases, technological spillovers, and a common pool of 
exhaustible natural resources. 
WITCH contains a detailed representation of the energy sector, which allows the model to 
produce a reasonable characterisation of future energy and technological scenarios and an 
assessment of their compatibility with the goal of stabilising greenhouse gases concentrations. 
In addition, by endogenously modelling fuel prices (oil, coal, natural gas, uranium), as well as   5
the cost of storing the CO2 captured, the model can be used to evaluate the implication of 
mitigation policies on the energy system in all its components. 
In WITCH, emissions arise from fossil fuels used in the energy sector and from land use 
changes that release carbon sequestered in biomasses and soils. Emissions of CH4, N2O, SLF 
(short-lived fluorinated gases), LLF (long-lived fluorinated) and SO2 aerosols, which have a 
cooling effect on temperature, are also identified. Since most of these gases are determined by 
agricultural practices, the modelling relies on estimates for reference emissions, and a top-down 
approach for mitigation supply curves.
5 
A climate module governs the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere and the temperature 
response to growing GHGs concentrations. WITCH is also equipped with a damage function 
that provides the feedback on the economy of global warming. However, in this study we do not 
take a cost-benefit approach. We work in a “cost-minimisation” framework: with a given target 
in terms of GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere, we produce scenarios that minimise the 
cost of achieving this target. 
Endogenous technological dynamics are a key feature of WITCH. Dedicated R&D investments 
increase the knowledge stock that governs energy efficiency. Learning-by-doing curves are used 
to model cost dynamics for wind and solar capital costs. Both energy-efficiency R&D and 
learning exhibit international spillovers.  There are two backstop technologies: one in the 
electricity sector and the other in the non-electricity sector. They necessitate dedicated 
innovation investments to become competitive. In line with the most recent literature, the costs 
of these backstop technologies are modelled through a so-called two-factor learning curve, in 
which their price declines with investments in both dedicated R&D and  technology diffusion. 
2.2 Directed Technical Change with Intersectoral Spillovers 
Gross output,  () t n GY ,,
6 in region n at time t is produced by combining energy services, 
() t n ES , , and capital-labour services  ( ) t n KLS ,  in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
                                                 
5 Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) is estimated to offer sizeable low-cost 
abatement potential. WITCH includes a baseline projection of land use CO2 emissions, as well as 
estimates of the global potential and costs for reducing emissions from deforestation, assuming that all 
tropical forest nations can join an emission trading system and have the capacity to implement REDD 
programs. However, avoided deforestation is not a source of emissions reductions in the version of the 
model that we used for this study. 
6 Net output,  () t n Y , , is obtained after accounting for the effects of climate change on production and the 
expenditure for fuels and carbon capture and sequestration, as shown in the Appendix.   6
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Energy services and capital-labour services are obtained by aggregating capital-labour and 
energy inputs with knowledge, which raises the productivity of raw inputs. As a proxy of 
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() t n HKL ,  and  ( ) t n HE , , respectively. The aggregation between raw inputs and knowledge is 
assumed to follow a standard CES function: 
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Calibration details are discussed in Section 3. The energy input  ( ) t n EN , , is produced in the 
energy sector of the economy, and we refer to Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2007) for a more 
detailed description. It basically consists of a series of nested CES functions that describe 
energy supply and demand at different levels of aggregation. Capital and labour are aggregated 
in a CES nest to produce the capital-labour raw input KL as follows: 
( ) () () () []
KL KL KL t n L n t n K n t n KL KL C KL
ρ ρ ρ α α
/ 1
) , ( 1 ) , ( , − + =    (4) 
This formulation is supported by empirical evidence, as explained in Carraro, Massetti and 
Nicita (2009).
8  
2.3 The R&D Sectors 
The stocks of knowledge that each region can use to increase the productivity of capital-labour 
and energy inputs is accrued by means of investments in R&D which are in turn enhanced by 
knowledge spillovers. We account for two different types of knowledge spillovers. First, 
knowledge is produced by standing on the shoulders of one nation's giants: investment in R&D 
is combined with the stock of ideas already discovered and produces new knowledge which will 
be the base for new discoveries in the following years (Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995; Popp, 2004). 
These can be seen as intertemporal spillovers or, from another perspective, as intrasectoral, 
lagged spillovers. Second, with this study we introduce intersectoral knowledge spillovers by 
                                                 
7 Where () σ σ ρ / 1 − =  and σ is the elasticity of substitution. 
8 See, among others: van der Werf (2007) and Chang (1994).   7
including among the inputs of the idea generating process in one sector of knowledge 
accumulated in the other sector. Accordingly, the production of new ideas,  () t n Z , , in the 
energy and non-energy sectors is modelled as follows: 
()
d c b
HE HE t n HKL t n HE t n I  a   t n Z ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , = , (5) 
()
i h g
HKL HKL t n HE t n HKL t n I  f   t n Z ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , = . (6) 
Where  1 < + + d c b  and  1 < + + i h g . We assume that obsolescence makes a fraction δ  of 
past ideas not fruitful for the purpose of current innovation activity. As a consequence, the 
stocks of knowledge evolve according to the following law of motion: 
( ) t n Z t n  HE )  t HE(n HE , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + − = + δ  (7) 
( ) t n Z t n  HKL )  t HKL(n HKL , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + − = + δ  (8) 
The decision variables of the model are the investments in physical capital (for all different 
technologies in the energy sector and for the domestic capital stock), the two types of R&D 
investments and fuels expenditures for non-electric energy. As a consequence, the decision to 
invest in energy R&D and non-energy R&D, and therefore total R&D, is endogenous. It is 
optimally derived in each region by solving a dynamic open-loop game, which leads to a Nash 
equilibrium. 
We can either solve the model assuming that knowledge spillovers are an externality, which the 
social planner that governs the economy is not able to control, or we can assume that society 
fully internalises knowledge externalities and chooses the optimal path of R&D investments 
accordingly. Our baseline scenario is constructed with the hypothesis that intertemporal (or 
intrasectoral) spillovers are fully internalised while knowledge spills across sectors as an 
externality. With this set-up we reproduce the sub-optimal investment in knowledge due to 
intersectoral spillovers. We increase  the realism of the model and introduce the possibility to 
study climate policy in a second-best setting at regional level. This is not frequent in IAMs.   8
3. Calibration 
We depart from the standard version of the model
9 and we adopt the same nesting structure of 
the production function as in Carraro, Massetti and Nicita (2009), which introduce directed 
technical change in WITCH. The elasticity between energy and capital-labour services,  Y σ , is 
set equal to 0.5 . The elasticity of substitution between labour and capital,  KL σ , is equal to 0.8 
for all regions with the exceptions of China and South Asia, for which we allow a greater 
elasticity of substitution ( KL σ  equal to 0.85). The elasticity of substitution between energy and 
energy knowledge,  ES σ , is set equal to 1.67, and the same value is used for the elasticity 
between capital-labour and non-energy knowledge,  KLS σ . For a detailed description of 
empirical evidence supporting the chosen structure and parameters values we refer to Carraro, 
Massetti and Nicita (2009). 
The innovation possibility frontier has been calibrated for both the energy and the non-energy 
sector using data from the empirical literature and adjusting the productivity parameter to 
reproduce the R&D over GDP ratio at the base year (2005) and the dynamics observed in the 
past.
10 The initial stock of non-energy knowledge is built using the perpetual inventory model. 
The value of the elasticity of new knowledge creation with respect to intersectoral spillovers is 
set equal to 0.13. The choice of this value is based on the empirical work of Malerba, Mancuso 
and Montobbio (2007), which estimate a spillover-augmented knowledge production function 
analogous to the one we use in our work. They find that, at macro level, the elasticity of 
knowledge creation with respect to intersectoral spillovers is comprised between 0.11 and 0.20. 
4. The Business as Usual Scenario 
Our Business as Usual scenario (BaU) is obtained as an open-loop Nash equilibrium in which 
regions compete on the use of the environmental public good, on the use of fuels.  A lagged, 
global, learning-by-doing process governs the cost of wind and solar power plants.
11 
                                                 
9 We use here the latest version of the model, WITCH08 as described in Bosetti et al (2009). In the latest 
version, the model was updated withrecent data and revised estimates for future projection of population, 
economic activity, energy consumptions and climate variables. The base calibration year has been set at 
2005. 
10 For an alternative approach see Bosetti et al (2008). 
11 In Bosetti et al (2008) and in other versions of the model there are also international knowledge 
spillovers in the Energy R&D sector. In this study we do not include international knowledge spillovers   9
Table 1 summarises baseline trends of major variables and indicators of interest. Gross World 
Product (GWP) increases over the entire century, starting from 44 trillion in 2005. It reaches 
365 trillions in 2100, an almost nine-fold expansion. Population is exogenous, it grows at a 
declining rate and reaches a plateau at the end of the century. Gains in energy efficiency explain 
the reduction of emissions per unit of output. However, the strong expansion of output, coupled 
with a slight increase in carbon intensity, offsets all efficiency gains and overall carbon 
emissions increase throughout the century. This leads to a more than two-fold expansion of 
GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere. 
2005 2025 2045 2065 2085 2100
GWP (Trillions, 2005 USD) 44.21 87.94 151.81 228.00 306.46 359.30
World Population (billions) 6.51 8.01 9.02 9.53 9.51 8.96
Energy Intensity of Output (EJ/USD) 9.69 7.09 5.25 4.09 3.37 3.00
Carbon Intensity of Primary Energy (GtonC/EJ) 0.0183 0.0190 0.0201 0.0212 0.0221 0.0221
Concentrations of GHG (ppmv) 427 506 624 756 888 980
Investment in final good capital(%GWP) 20.23 18.49 16.82 15.57 14.51 13.98
R&D expenditure (%GWP) 2.15 2.24 2.30 2.38 2.45 2.46
Non-energy R&D (%GWP) 2.13 2.22 2.28 2.36 2.43 2.44
Energy Efficiency R&D (%GWP) 0.0216 0.0189 0.0181 0.0240 0.0178 0.0174
Energy R&D (%Total Investment in R&D) 1.01 0.84 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.71
 
Table 1. Baseline trend of major variables. 
The model features an increasing path of R&D expenditure, as share of GWP. The fraction of 
investment devoted to knowledge creation is increasing. The model features a slightly declining 
path of energy R&D as share of GWP, an increasing path of non-energy R&D as share of GWP, 
and a declining rate of energy to non-energy R&D investments, with a relative share of energy 
R&D over total R&D declining from 0.73% to 0.61%. This is mainly explained by the fact that 
fossil fuels tend to remain inexpensive in our baseline scenario and do not motivate energy 
efficiency expenditures. 
The optimal R&D investment path is in line with the historical trends of aggregate R&D. Figure 
1 shows both the historical levels and the optimal trend of total R&D over GWP at world level. 
                                                                                                                                               
but we still have international technological spillovers by means of a world learning curve for wind and 
solar power plants.   10
Historic data feature a slightly increasing trend over the past 10 years, starting from 2% in 1996 
and reaching 2.1% in 2005. The same trend is predicted in the baseline scenario, with total R&D 













Figure 1. R&D as percentage of GWP. 
5. Addressing the environmental externality: The 
Stabilisation Scenario 
In this Section we explore how a policy to address the environmental externality only affects the 
rate and direction of technical progress when intersectoral spillovers between energy and non-
energy R&D are modelled. 
We correct the environmental externality by means of a policy to stabilise the level of GHGs 
concentration in the atmosphere. We construct a stabilisation scenario by imposing a cap on 
carbon emissions and by letting regions exchange carbon allowances on a global carbon market, 
which equates marginal abatement costs globally. We choose here a “Contraction and 
Convergence” allocation of carbon allowances.
12 The path of emissions that we impose leads to 
a stabilisation of CO2 concentrations at 550ppm CO2-eq target all GHGs included. 
                                                 
12 With the “Contraction and Convergence” rule, permits are first distributed in proportion to present 
emissions and then the allocation progressively converges to an Equal-per-Capita allocation scheme, 
which becomes the allocation rule from 2050 onwards. In the Equal-per-Capita rule permits are 
distributed to regions in proportion to their population. Banking and borrowing of emissions allowances 
are not allowed, but there is no restriction to international trade of permits.   11
2005 2025 2045 2065 2085 2100
GWP (Trillions, 2005 USD) 44.21 87.09 149.26 221.43 301.26 358.44
World Population (billions) 6.51 8.01 9.02 9.53 9.51 8.96
Energy Intensity of Output (EJ/USD) 9.69 5.98 3.47 2.37 2.08 2.00
Carbon Intensity of Primary Energy (GtonC/EJ) 0.0183 0.0157 0.0107 0.0071 0.0056 0.0048
Concentrations of GHG (ppmv) 427 491 533 548 550 552
Investment in final good capital(%GWP) 20.24 18.11 15.87 14.53 13.54 13.09
R&D expenditure (%GWP) 2.12 2.21 2.19 2.25 2.31 2.32
Non-energy R&D (%GWP) 2.09 2.14 2.13 2.19 2.25 2.27
Energy Efficiency R&D (%GWP) 0.0265 0.0304 0.0390 0.0740 0.0382 0.0356
Energy R&D (%Total Investment in R&D) 1.25 1.38 1.78 1.80 1.65 1.54
 
Table 2. Stabilisation trends of major variables. 
Table 2 displays the trend of key economic variables when the stabilisation policy is 
implemented. The Gross World Product (GWP) over the whole optimisation interval 2005-2100 
is lower than in the BaU scenario and discounted stabilisation policy costs are equivalent to 
1.5% of BaU discounted GWP (using a 3% declining discount rate).
13 
The stabilisation policy has a remarkable impact on R&D dynamics, as the comparison between 
Table 1 and Table 2 clearly shows. First, it induces much higher spending in energy efficiency 
R&D, confirming results already established by a wide literature.
14 Second, the stabilisation 
policy induces a contraction of non-energy R&D spending, which is greater than the increase in 
energy efficiency R&D and thus determines an overall contraction of R&D activity. 
Reduced spending in non-energy R&D is due to: (1) a general contraction of economic activity 
and (2) the fact that non-energy augmenting technical change is energy biased because of the 
complementarity between the energy and the non-energy sector. With energy biased technical 
change, an increase of non-energy R&D spending would increase energy use, and vice versa: by 
reducing non-energy R&D spending it is possible to reduce energy demand, an important way 
to cut emissions in a stabilisation scenario. It is therefore the stabilisation policy itself that 
                                                 
13 The WITCH model uses an aggregate damage function to describe the feedback of temperature 
increase on GDP of each region. We thus account for the environmental benefits from the stabilisation 
policy. Costs rise because the stabilisation target imposed here is stricter than what found as optimal in a 
cost-benefit analysis with the WITCH model. 
14 See for example Bosetti et al (2009a) for an analysis with the WITCH model.   12
induces a contraction of the optimal level of R&D in the non-energy sector, and not the 
competition from higher spending in energy R&D. Carraro, Massetti and Nicita (2009) widely 
discussed this result and argued against the exogenous crowding-out hypothesis imposed in 
Nordhaus (2002) and Popp (2004, 2006) on the grounds that, at least in the medium/long term, 
societies are free to allocate the optimal amount of resources to knowledge creation. Recent 
empirical evidence presented in Newell and Popp (2009) confirms this intuition, showing that 
increased spending in energy R&D does not crowd out non-energy R&D. 
By introducing a mutual link between the two knowledge frontiers, the stabilisation policy 
triggers more complicated dynamics of both energy and non-energy R&D investments (see 
equations 5 and 6). With respect to the model without intersectoral spillovers, the policy-
induced positive shock to the stock of energy sector knowledge is transmitted to the non-energy 
sector. It increases the marginal return to non-energy R&D and partially offsets the contraction 
of R&D induced by the stabilisation policy. The final outcome is still a contraction of non-
energy R&D greater than the increment in energy R&D, confirming the result that the 
stabilisation policy reduces knowledge accumulation even when endogenous spillovers are 
modelled. 
It is now interesting to check how far the level of aggregate R&D spending in a stabilization 
policy is from the socially desirable one.
15 Figure 2 and  
Figure 3 show the time path of R&D investments – as percentage of GWP – when the 
stabilisation policy is implemented and domestic knowledge externalities are internalised. The 
optimal path of energy R&D investments is characterised by a declining trend over the century. 
The converse is true for the optimal time path of non-energy R&D investments: the trend is 
increasing because the labour becomes a scarce resource as population growth levels off by 
mid-century. The difference between the optimal path and the second-best scenarios is striking. 
If we consider energy R&D, the stabilisation policy brings R&D investments closer to the 
socially optimal level. Remarkably, the jump from the level optimal in the BaU does not close 
the R&D gap. Contrary  to what happens in energy R&D, the stabilisation policy brings 
investments in non-energy R&D. Consequently, total R&D investment moves farther away 
from the optimal level. 
                                                 
15 Here we define an optimal world as one in which the stabilisation policy is implemented to correct the 
environmental externality and knowledge intersectoral externalities that are fully internalised in each 
region. This should not be confused with the global optimum, because we do not internalise other 
international externalities – e.g. on non-renewable resources use – and it is also not precisely a regional 
optimum, because the stabilisation policy is designed by a global social planner.   13
When only the environmental externality is addressed, there is ample space for R&D policies 
that correct the knowledge externality in both sectors, jointly or separately. In Section 7 we 
study the welfare implications of addressing both externalities. In the next section we address 
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Figure 3. Investments in non-energy R&D/GWP. 
6. Addressing the knowledge externality: R&D policies 
In this section we study the implication of addressing only the knowledge externality by means 
of R&D policies that reduce the gap between the private and the social return to knowledge 
creation. R&D policies typically increase the attractiveness of knowledge creation by reducing   14
the cost of innovation by means of subsidies or by increasing the reward to innovators with the 
imposition of constraints to knowledge circulation. In this case, we are not interested in the 
specificities of R&D policy, nor in its cost. In this section our aim is to assess the implications 
for the environmental externality of a hypothetical R&D policy that internalises all knowledge 
externalities in the energy sector first and then in both sectors. R&D policies that increase the 
rate of technical change are often proposed to solve both environmental and knowledge market 
failures. Here we provide a test of this proposition. 
We consider two different R&D policies. First, only the externality of energy R&D is 
internalised (R&D Policy Energy). Second, externalities in both sectors are internalised (R&D 
Policy). Figure 4 and Figure 5 display the time path of the ratio of R&D when the policy is 
implemented and R&D in the BaU for the energy and non-energy sectors. We record a sharp 
increment of energy R&D spending when sectoral spillovers are internalised(i.e. when the social 
planner acknowledges the contribution of energy knowledge to the production of non-energy 
knowledge). Disentangling the exact forces at work is difficult because of productivity 
feedbacks driven by the mutual link between the two innovation possibility frontiers and by the 
complementarity of the two knowledge stocks.
16 The R&D policy in the energy sector leads to 
higher energy R&D spending, which increases the productivity of non-energy knowledge 
creation (see the higher spending in non-energy R&D induced by the energy R&D policy in 
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Figure 4. Ratio between investments in Energy R&D under different policy schemes and energy 
                                                 
16 In this respect, to test the existence of complementarity across the two sectors we performed an 
exercise in which we measure the impact of a forced expansion of energy R&D investments on non-
energy R&D investments in the absence of spillovers. Energy R&D investments are required to be, in 
each region, exactly equal to the optimal path determined when spillovers are fully internalised. We find 
that non-energy R&D investments, respond positively to an increase of energy R&D, revealing a degree 
of complementarity between the two knowledge stocks.   15
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Figure 5. Ratio between investments in non-energy R&D under different policy schemes and non-
energy R&D investments in BaU. 
Both policies induce higher spending in R&D and an increment of both knowledge stocks with 
respect to the BaU. The increment of knowledge (i.e. of productivity) in the two sectors has 
opposite effects on energy demand: if from one side higher productivity of the energy input 
determines a lower demand of energy, from the other side the increased productivity of the non-
energy input pushes for a higher demand of the complementary energy input. The final outcome 
on energy demand is driven by the relative strength of these effects, which is ultimately 
determined by the relative scarcity of the energy and non-energy inputs. In our BaU scenario, in 
the long run, technical change is directed towards energy-biased knowledge because energy is 
relatively more abundant than the capital-labour input. In both R&D Policy scenarios this effect 
is enhanced and technical progress in the long run becomes more and more energy-biased; thus, 
the demand of energy increases. The carbon intensity of energy remains largely unaffected 
because regions behave non-cooperatively on the global commons and do not internalise the 
environmental externality. Therefore, the R&D policies address the knowledge market failure 
without controlling for the environmental one. The implications of the two scenarios on CO2 
emissions are depicted in Figure 6. 
Overall, R&D policies (including the one that internalises energy R&D externality) increase 
voracity, i.e. the attitude of countries in a non-cooperative setting to grab as much as possible of 
a common good, to preserve rate of return equalisation, thus exacerbating climate damage.   16















Figure 6. World cumulative CO2 emissions (2005-2100). 
7. Addressing both environmental and knowledge 
externalities: policy costs and welfare comparison  
The previous sections have shown that addressing only the knowledge externalities increases 
the environmental problem and addressing only the environmental externality is, at best, not 
sufficient to bring R&D investments to the socially desirable level. In fact, the environmental 
policy exacerbates the knowledge externality in the non-energy sector. Therefore, at least in our 
modelling context, policies that address both externalities appear to be socially desirable. 
A first approach to evaluate the attractiveness of different policy mixes is to check their impact 
on GWP. This is the most preferred method in climate policy analysis because it allows the 
aggregation of benefits and costs without the need of a social welfare function.
17 Figure 7 shows 
that the energy R&D policy has a remarkable impact on stabilisation costs: combining an 
energy R&D policy to the stabilisation policy would reduce costs to 0.14% of GDP for OECD 
countries and would also cut them considerably in non-OECD ones. At global level, 
stabilisation costs would be reduced to roughly one fourth of what they would be without the 
energy R&D policy. As expected, the energy R&D policy has a greater impact on costs in 
OCED countries, were the bulk of the knowledge externality is found. Figure 7 also shows that 
internalising all knowledge externalities reduces stabilisation costs further, even if by a lesser 
extent than the energy R&D policy. Stabilisation costs virtually disappear for OCED countries. 
For non-OECD countries the reduction of costs is less pronounced, as expected, and at global 
                                                 
17 Stabilisation costs are measured as the discounted sum of year–by-year GWP differences between the 
policy scenarios and the BaU scenario. It is expressed as a percentage of the BaU scenario GWP. As 
mentioned before, we abstract here from the complex assessment of the costs of the R&D policy.   17
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Figure 7. Discounted Stabilisation policy cost. 
The fact that complementing the Stabilisation policy with an R&D policy brings a reduction of 
stabilisation costs is in line with the findings of Goulder and Schneider (1997) and Popp (2006). 
However, there are some important differences between the three models and the policies 
examined. Goulder and Schneider (1997) focus on intrasectoral spillovers and find that an R&D 
policy reduces stabilisation costs only if it addresses R&D externalities in all sectors. If 
restricted only to sectors with low emissions, the R&D policy increases stabilisation costs. Popp 
(2006) shows that higher spending in energy R&D reduces only marginally stabilisation costs 
because it crowds out non-energy R&D investments. The crowding-out is exogenous because  
Popp does not model the explicit knowledge accumulation in the non-energy sector. Contrary to 
Popp (2006) we do not impose exogenous crowding-out assumptions because we model both 
knowledge stocks. We find that a stabilisation policy together with an R&D policy targeted at 
the only energy sector is significantly less costly than the stabilisation policy alone. We find that 
energy R&D does not crowd-out non-energy R&D and, thanks to intersectoral spillovers, the 
policy induced increase in energy efficiency R&D spills over to the non-energy sector, 
contributing to knowledge accumulation and the reduction of knowledge externalities. 
A more appropriate method to compare alternative policies is to rank them using regional 
welfare – i.e. the discounted sum of log utility of consumption per capita.
18 Table displays the 
                                                 
18 A global analysis would require a global welfare function which is subject to complex evaluations of 
weighting schemes of regional welfares. The discount rate used is the pure rate of time preference. The 
regions of the WITCH model are: CAJANZ (Canada, Japan, New Zealand); USA; LACA (Latin 
America, Mexico and Caribbean); WEURO (Western Europe); EEURO (Estern Europe); MENA (Middle   18
relative regional preference ordering among the Stabilisation scenario, the Stabilisation R&D 
Policy Energy, in which only the energy sector externality is internalised, and the Stabilisation 
R&D Policy scenario, in which all knowledge externalities are internalised. Preferences are 
ranked in decreasing order and the policy mix with the highest welfare is ranked number one. 
USA WEURO EEURO KOSAU CAJAZ TE MENA SSA SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA
Stabilization 3 333 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Stabilization R&D Policy Energy 1 111 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1
Stabilization R&D Policy  2 222 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
OECD non-OECD
 
Table 3. Welfare ranking of different policy mixes. 
 
Addressing knowledge externalities is welfare enhancing for all regions, and for most of them 
an R&D policy that targets externalities only for energy R&D is preferred to an R&D policy 
that internalises all knowledge externalities. This result is important because it shows that it is 
rational to pay special attention to energy R&D policies in a Stabilisation scenario. The idea that 
once the environmental externalities are corrected, all kinds of R&D should be treated the same 
is compelling, but it is valid only in a simplified setting, as in Nordhaus (2009). In our model we 
find a different result for two main reasons. First, an R&D policy, which targets also the non-
energy sector increases the productivity of non-energy inputs and causes a higher demand of 
energy – because technical change is energy biased. Second, the equilibrium of the WITCH 
model is the result of an open-loop Nash game in which countries do not coordinate their 
actions to achieve an optimum at planetary scale. Therefore, regions do not coordinate 
themselves when they implement the R&D policy and look only at the national optimal level of 
R&D spending. As a result, they increase the demand of energy beyond the globally optimal 
level and the price of emissions permits rises: in our Stabilisation R&D Policy scenario the 
carbon price is roughly 1% higher over the whole century than in the Stabilisation R&D Policy 
Energy scenario. Countries with relatively higher carbon intensity suffer higher stabilisation 
costs and see their welfare reduced, while Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia (SASIA) and 
East Asia (EASIA), all net sellers of emissions allowances, gain from both a higher productivity 
of the economy and a higher carbon price. This explains the results shown in Table. 
                                                                                                                                               
East and North Africa); SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa); TE (Transition Economies); 
SASIA (South Asia); CHINA (including Taiwan); EASIA (South East Asia); KOSAU (Korea, South 
Africa, Australia).   19
A final insight that we can draw from this enhanced version of the WITCH model with directed 
technical change, is how estimates of stabilisation costs change if the constraints on emissions is 
imposed on an economy in which investments in R&D are equal to the socially optimal level. 
We find that the cost of the stabilisation policy is higher if the starting point is an economy in 
which all knowledge externalities are internalised. In particular, not only stabilisation costs 
increase in absolute value, as it is reasonable to expect in economies that are more efficient and 
thus have higher output, but they are also higher in percentage terms as Figure 8 shows. The 
reason is the non-linearity of marginal abatement costs: an economy that has no constraints on 
emissions but starts with higher R&D investments and thus higher output, will have higher 
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Figure 8 Discounted Stabilisation Policy Cost in second-best or optimal world. 
8. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we present results of a sensitivity analysis on the elasticity of new knowledge 
creation with respect to intersectoral spillovers, to check the robustness of the main findings of 
our work. The value of the elasticity has been varied in a reasonable range around the central 
value 0.135 . 
The first result to test is the impact of the stabilisation policy on non-energy knowledge 
accumulation. We find that the ratio of non-energy R&D investment in the Stabilisation 
scenario to non-energy R&D investment in the BaU scenario is only minimally affected by 
different assumptions on the elasticity of substitution (see Figure 9, where the central case is 
depicted by a solid line). 
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The second result that we test is the sharp increment of energy R&D investments when the 
R&D policy is implemented. We can confirm that the R&D policy substantially increases the 
optimal amount of energy R&D investments under a sufficiently large range of elasticity 
parameters, as shown in Figure 10. The increment of spending in energy R&D caused by the 
R&D policy remains remarkable, even for values of the elasticity of substitution that are at the 
lower bound of empirical estimates. 
We then consider the effect of implementing both climate and knowledge policies. As shown in 
Figure 11 and in Figure 12 the higher the value of elasticity, the greater the impact is of 
internalising knowledge externalities on both total R&D and on the costs of stabilisation. We 
even find that for value of the elasticity greater than 0.135, GWP increases with respect to the 
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  Figure 11 Ratio of R&D investments  Figure 12 Discounted stabilisation policy costs, 
  with stabilisation and R&D policy to  with and without R&D policy. 
  R&D investments with stabilisation. 
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Finally we test the impact on emissions by internalising only knowledge externalities. As shown 
in Figure 13 we find a positive correlation between emissions and the value of elasticity. We 
also find that for all values of elasticities included in our analysis, implementing only one policy 
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Figure 13. Ratio of CO2 emissions in BaU with R&D policy to CO2 emissions in BaU. 
9. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature by expanding our understanding of the optimal mix of 
climate policies. In particular, the aim of this paper is to answer three policy questions that are 
relevant for the design of climate policy. First, what is the optimal response, in terms of 
investments in R&D of a policy to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of GHGs in a second-
best framework? Second, what would be the optimal amount of R&D spending in the energy 
and non-energy sectors and what would be the environmental consequences of addressing only 
the knowledge externality? Third, what are the welfare implications of a policy mix that 
combines a stabilisation policy with R&D policies to support the optimal level of innovation? 
We answer the above questions using an enhanced version of the WITCH model with directed 
technical change in which we have explicitly modelled intersectoral spillovers. R&D 
investments can be used to increase the productivity of the energy input and of non-energy 
inputs. Knowledge spills from one sector to the other, contributing to the generation of new 
ideas in a sector in which it was not originally accumulated. 































































sector and it even worsens market failures in the non-energy sector. This result confirms what 
was already found by Carraro, Massetti and Nicita (2009) in a model without intersectoral 
spillovers. Correcting the environmental externality alone has contrasting effects on the 
knowledge externality. Given the relative size of the two sectors, the stabilisation policy induces 
a lower amount of R&D spending than in the BaU. The answer to the first question is  that the 
stabilisation policy brings us farther from the optimal level of R&D spending. The stabilisation 
policy thus increases the need for policies to correct for the knowledge externality instead of 
reducing it. 
When only the knowledge externalities are corrected, we find that voracity – i.e. the attitude of 
countries to grab as much as possible of a common resource in a non-cooperative setting – 
exacerbates the environmental externality. Higher productivity, without a specific control for 
environmental externalities, is automatically translated into higher energy demand. Without any 
incentive to decarbonise energy, this results in higher carbon emissions and increased global 
warming. Interestingly, this happens also when we correct externalities only in the energy 
sector, enhancing the overall energy efficiency of the economies. 
It seems that correcting both externalities is welfare enhancing with respect to enacting the 
single policies alone. The question is, however, what is the optimal mix of these policies? If we 
use GDP to compare the policy mixes, we find lower stabilisation costs if we complement the 
environmental policy with an R&D policy that internalise both knowledge externalities. If 
instead, we compare the policy scenarios using discounted utility, which is a more appropriate 
indicator of welfare than GDP, we obtain an important result: the preferred policy mix (in most 
regions) combines the Stabilisation policy with a policy to correct knowledge market 
externalities in the energy R&D sector alone. We thus find evidence to support the idea to 
combine a stabilisation policy with a policy to support energy R&D only.  
So far, the debate on the optimal policy mix has been intense but vague. With this paper we 
have introduced a more sophisticated approach to describe knowledge dynamics by providing 
insights to the modelling community. We have also produced a first set of results that give 
substance to policy discussions.   23
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Appendix. Model Equations and List of Variables. 
In this Appendix we reproduce the main equations of the model. For a full description of the model please 
refer to Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2007). The list of variables is reported at the end. In each region, 
indexed by n, a social planner maximises the following utility function: 
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per capita consumption. 
Economic module 
The budget constraint defines consumption as net output less investments: 
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Where j denotes energy technologies. 
Output is produced via a nested CES function that combines a capital-labour aggregate and energy; 
capital and labour are obtained from a CES function. The climate damage Ω  reduces gross output; to 
obtain net output we subtract the costs of the fuels f and of CCS: 
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Total factor productivity  () t n TFP ,  evolves exogenously with time.  
Energy services are an aggregate of energy and a stock of knowledge combined with a CES function: 
( ) () () []
EN ES ES t n EN n t n HE n t n ES EN HE
ρ ρ ρ α α
/ 1
) , ( ) , ( , + = . (A5) 
Energy is a combination of electric and non-electric energy: 
() [ ]
EN EN EN t n NEL t n EL t n EN NEL EL
ρ ρ ρ α α
/ 1 ) , ( ) , ( , + = . (A6) 
Each factor is further decomposed into several sub-components. Figure 2 portrays a graphical illustration 
of the energy sector. Factors are aggregated using CES, linear and Leontief production functions. 
Capital-labour services are obtained aggregating a capital-labour input and a knowledge stock with a CES 
function: 
() ( ) ( ) []
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The capital-labour input is a CES combination of capital and labour. Labour is assumed to be equal to 
population and evolves exogenously. 
( ) () () []
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Final good capital accumulates following the standard perpetual rule:   28
() ( ) ( )( ) t n I t n  K   t n K C C C C , 1 , 1 , + − = + δ . (A9) 
New ideas which contribute to the stock of energy knowledge,  ( ) t n ZHE , , are produced using R&D 
investments,  () t n I EN D R , , & , together with the previously cumulated knowledge stock  () t n HE , : 
() ⋅ =
d c b
HE HE t n HKL t n HE t n I  a   t n Z ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ,  (A10) 
Similarly, new ideas in the non-energy sector are generated as follows: 
()
i h g
HKL HKL t n HE t n HKL t n I  f   t n Z ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , =    (A11) 
The two knowledge stocks evolve as follows: 
() t n Z t n  HE )  t HE(n HE , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + − = + δ  (A12) 
( ) t n Z t n  HKL )  t HKL(n HKL , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + − = + δ  (A13) 
For illustrative purposes, we show how electricity is produced via capital, operation and maintenance and 
resource use through a zero-elasticity Leontief aggregate: 
() () () ( ) { } t n X t n O&M t n K t n EL EL j j j j n j j n j , ; , ; , min , , , , ς τ μ = . (A14) 
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where, for selected technologies, the new capital investment cost SC(n,t)  decreases with the world 
cumulated installed capacity by means of Learning-by-Doing: 
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Operation and maintenance is treated as an investment that fully depreciates every year. The resources 
employed in electricity production are subtracted from output in equation A3 and A4. Their prices are 
calculated endogenously using a reduced-form cost function that allows for non-linearity in both the 
depletion effect and in the rate of extraction: 
() ( )( )( ) []
( ) n
f f f f f
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where  f Q  is cumulative extraction of fuel f : 
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−
= + = −
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0 , , 0 , 1 ,
t
s extr f f f s n X n Q t n Q . (A18) 
Each country covers consumption of fuel f ,  ( ) t n X f , , by either domestic extraction or imports, 
() t n X netimp f , , , or by a combination of both. If the country is a net exporter,  () t n X netimp f , ,  is negative. 
() () () t n X t n X t n X netimp f extr f f , , , , , + =  (A19) 
Climate Module 
GHGs emissions from combustion of fossil fuels are derived by applying stoichiometric coefficients to 
the total amount of fossil fuels utilised minus the amount of CO2 sequestered: 
() () () t n CCS t n X t n CO
f f CO f , , ,
2 , 2 − =∑ ω . (A20) 
When a cap on emission (CAP) is included we have an additional equation, constraining emissions, given 
the possibility to sell and buy permits: 
() ) , ( ) , ( , 2 t n NIP t n CAP t n CO + =  (A21) 
In addition, carbon permits revenues/expenses enter the budget constraint: 
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The damage function impacting output varies with global temperature:   29
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Temperature increases through augmented radiating forcing F(t): 
[ ] {} ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 2 1 t T t T t T t F t T t T LO − − − + + = + σ λ σ  (A23) 
which in turn depends on CO2 concentrations: 
[ ] { } ) ( ) 2 log( / ) ( log ) ( t O M t M t F
PI
AT AT + − =η , (A24) 
caused by emissions from fuel combustion and land use change: 
() [] ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) 1 ( 21 11 2 t M t M t LU t n CO t M UP AT
n
j AT φ φ + + + = + ∑ , (A25) 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 32 12 22 t M t M t M t M LO AT UP UP φ φ φ + + = + , (A26) 
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 23 33 t M t M t M UP LO LO φ φ + = + . (A27) 
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